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[Unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document,
especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than
approximate precision... Apartfrom the ambiguity inherent in its
symbols, a statute suffers from dubieties. It is not an equation or a
formula representinga clearly markedprocess....
-Justice

Felix Frankfurter, 1947'

[T~he theoreticalfoundation of [fuzzy logic] is actually quite
precise and rathermathematical in spirit.... In effect, the level of
precision in a particular application can be adjusted to fit the
needs of the task and the accuracy of the available data.
-Professor

Lotfi Zadeh, 19732

The emerging mathematical discipline of "fuzzy logic" has recently sparked
dramatic efficiencies in modern industrial processes while inviting comparisons to
the age-old philosophies of Taoism and Zen. As concepts of "fuzziness" have
filtered from technical journals 3 to popular science magazines 4 to trade
paperbacks, 5 they have begun to appear in legal commentaries as well .6
Though this unique mathematical method reflects and reduces the ambiguity in
definitions and rules, the few discussions of its implications for the legal process
'Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947).
2 Lotfi A. Zadeh, Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex Systems and Decision
Processes, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-3, No. 1, 28-44, 30 (1973).
3 See, e.g., infra at notes 12, 13, & 47 (demonstrating extensive application of fuzzy logic).
4 See, e.g., Bart Kosko and Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic - The binary logic of modern computers often falls
short when describing the vagueness of the real world. Fuzzy logic offers more graceful alternatives, 269
Sci. AM. 76, 76 (1993) (listing everyday examples where Fuzzy Control Theory is used). The authors state,
"[I1n many fields [one] may find that fuzzy common sense models are more useful or accurate that are
standard mathematic ones." id.
5 See BART KosKo, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF Fuzzy LOGIC XVI (1993) (stating that
"fuzzy world even extended as much to culture and philosophy as it did to science and math."); DANIEL
MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, Fuzzy LOGIC: THE REVOLUTIONARY COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY THAT 1S
CHANGING OUR WORLD (1993) (surveying applications of fuzzy logic theory).
6 See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to
Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 1403, 1406
(1994) (noting that fuzzy logic offers "more graceful alternative in which to view, analyze, and speak about
fraudulent transfer law."); Leif M. Clark, Fuzzy Thinking and Legislating Logically, 12 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 14, 14 (1994) (discussing effects of fuzzy logic on bankruptcy legislation); Leif M. Clark, Some Fuzzy
Thoughts, II AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 14 (1993) (contemplating role of fuzzy logic in evolution of
bankruptcy law); Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Corporate Law: An Essay
on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 497 (1991) (discussing effect of fuzzy logic on
burden of proof allocating theory); David A. Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof
and Choice, 66 B.U. L. REv. 825, 862-66 (1986) (applying fuzzy logic theory to evidence and inference).
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either emphasize the logic and generalize about the law 7 or vice versa. This paper
attempts to bridge the two fields more effectively by analyzing the elements of
fuzzy logic and suggesting ways in which they
9 may be used to model and
manipulate the building blocks of bankruptcy law.
Parts I and II of this paper address "fuzzy sets," which heighten the sensitivity
of traditional "true-false" logic by introducing different degrees of "truth" to reflect
variations in the objects, people, or situations under examination. These sets and
their combinations can be used to refine concepts currently undefined or vaguely
described by the Bankruptcy Code.
Part III examines "fuzzy decision theory," which addresses simultaneously two
different forms of ambiguous criteria relevant to decision-making. This process
may prove useful not only for judges and lawyers but for also for legislators.
In Part IV, uses overlapping sets of "fuzzy algorithms"- simple "if-then" rules
incorporating varying degrees of indeterminacy, in model situations whose actual
intricacy would be difficult to reduce to equations or even verbal descriptions.
Through systems of such rules, fuzzy logicians attempt to "emulate the
approximation of the human reasoning process, quantify imprecise information,
and make decisions based on vague and incomplete data.
Applying
a
1
'defuzzification' process, they attempt to arrive at definite conclusions."' 0
At this stage, fuzzy logic has come full circle. Where it initially added color to
the black and white palette of classical logic, its fuzzy rules now separate and
simplify the rich hues found in the spectra of complex functions.
Yet
paradoxically, "by moving away from the use of quantified variables and toward
the use of the type of linguistic descriptions employed by humans, we acquire a

See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 178-80, 262 (portraying law as fuzzy system of rules and principles and
stating, "Law is the set of fuzzy moral claims that society or the state backs up with force.").
8See Williams, supra note 6, at 1448-59 (rejecting "binary system" of existing fraudulent transfer law in
favor of fuzzy system; reviewing conflict between rules and standards).
9 See Clark, supra note 6, at 14 (proposing fuzzy logic model for analyzing effectiveness of chapter 11);

Edward S. Adams, et al., UnderstandingSecured Creditas a Fuzzy System, 80 VA. L. REV. 2233, 2237-46
(1994) (discussing effects of fuzzy logic on evolution of bankruptcy law).
'0 OFFICE OF CoMPuTERs AND BusINESS EQUIPMENT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FuzzY LOGIC: A KEY TECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS (1991)
[hereinafter, FUTURE COMPETIVENESS], at vii.
This report listed "several reasons why fuzzy logic technology is crucial to U.S. national interests":
(1) it can be used to create very advanced massively parallel computers; (2) it would help the United States
to maintain its position as a world leader in all types of software; (3) there is expected to be future growth
in the lucrative information systems market; (4) fuzzy logic can accelerate progress in the development of
image processing, pattern recognition, voice recognition, and machine vision, which could help maintain
the leadership of the United States industry in information technology. See id. at 8.
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capability to deal with systems which are much too complex to be susceptible to
analysis in conventional mathematical terms."' 1
Part V briefly discusses the promise of "fuzzy expert systems," which, by
combining factual databases with fuzzy legal models, would be able to offer instant
and informed legal guidance.
I.

FUZZY SETS

A. BlurringClassicalBoundaries
From its origins in the mid-1960's, 12 Lotfi A. Zadeh renamed the "multivalued
logic" of his predecessors as "fuzzy logic" and began reinvigorating it in his
seminal paper, Fuzzy Sets. 13 Fuzzy logic crystallized around the proposition that "in
sharp contrast to the notion of a class or set in mathematics, most of the classes in
the real world do not have crisp boundaries which separate those objects that
belong to a class from those that do not."'14 Instead, "everything is a matter of
degree." 15
Every day we encounter the ambiguity of "fuzzy" classes, such as the class of
"tall people." In a given crowd it may be easy to identify the tallest person, and
slightly more difficult to spot "all people (if any) over six feet tall," but how many
16
of the group can simply be called (i.e., are members of the class of) "tall people"?
We may all be able to agree that a seven-foot tall person is "tall," and a four-foot
tall person is not; but where between is the dividing line between theses two
extremes?
A related inquiry was posed by Greek philosophers as sorites or "the paradox
of the heap": at what point does a pile of sand from
which grains are removed one
17
by one until nothing remains stop being a "pile?"

11Zadeh, supra note 2, at 29.
12See MCNE1LL & FREIBERGER, supra note 5, at 28-34. The field has its roots in the work of America's
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), Poland's Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1955), and England's Harry Black
(1907-1988).
'" Lotfi A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, Information and Control 8, (3), June 1965, pp. 338-353.
14R.E. Bellman and Lotfi A. Zadeh, Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment, MGMT. SC. Dec. 1970, at
B-141. See also LOTFI A. ZADEH, Toward a Theory of Fuzzy Systems, in ASPECTS OF NETWORK AND
SYSTEM THEORY 470 (R.E. Kalman & N. DeClaris eds., 1971) [hereinafter ZADEH, FuzzySystems].

15See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 18 (identifying this statement as "the fuzzy principle").
16Here and in the examples below this paper does not take into account possible variation of the
definition of "tall" and "slim" between sexes. For example, because of differences in the typical men and
women, the height of a "tall" woman might be seen as the height of an "average" man. See also Schum,
supra note 6, at 866-67 (noting that most of our everyday reasoning, events or sets have boundaries that are
fuzzy).
17MCNELL & FREIBERGER, supra note 5, at 26-27.
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1. Truth Values
a. Classical
Classical or "binary" logic aggravates this ambiguity by restricting the "truth
value" of any statement to one of two alternatives. For example, "Chief Justice
Rehnquist is a tall person" or "On this table is a pile of sand" can either have a
"truth value" equal to 1 (when the statement is true) or 0 (when the statement is
false).
b. Fuzzy
By contrast to the traditional "crisp" definition of truth, in fuzzy logic the truth
value of a statement can occupy any value in the range between (and including) 0
and 1, depending on the extent to which its subject (Chief Justice Rehnquist or a
particular collection of sand grains) belongs to the specified class (of tall people, or
of piles of sand). A value of 0 indicates that the individual in question does not
belong to the class at all; a value of I indicates full belonging.
2. Set Theory
The truth and falsity of logical statements are often expressed through set
theory.' 8 For example, for each statement about members of a group or "set," there
will be a subgroup or "subset" of none (the "empty set") or more members for
which the statement is true.
a. Classical
In terms of set theory, the classical approach leads to "crisp" sets. An
individual member of the "universe" (of all people, or of all piles of sand) either
does or does not belong fully to a given set: Chief Justice Rehnquist either is tall or
is not, and the sand grains on the table either constitute a pile or do not.
To this extent, traditional logic rounds off, or approximates, variations among
members of a class. For instance, the natural distribution of heights among a large
population, which generally takes the shape of a "bell curve," would be
reduced to a "step function," as in Figure 1.

"SSee RICHARD

JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 38 (2d ed. 1981) (indicating "[it is

useful to picture logical relationships among statements as relationships among sets of cases in which those
statements are true.").
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b. Fuzzy
Fuzzy logic, however, involves "fuzzy sets" which allow individuals to be
"partial members."' 19 A fuzzy set is a class "in which the transition from
membership to non-membership is gradual rather than abrupt."20
Thus, variations in heights would be more closely reflected, as in Figure 2.
Notably, admitting such degrees of belonging also allows an individual to be
described as simultaneously a member (of value v, between 0 and 1) of one set
(say, tall people) and a member (of value 1 - v) of the "complementary" set of all
universe members who are not in the first set ("people who are not tall"). To the
extent that fuzzy logic admits that a statement and its opposite can both be
(partially) true, it rejects formal logic's "law of the excluded middle" and embraces
the more holistic perspectives of Taoism 2 1 and Zen Buddhism. 22 In examining

19 ZA JEH, Fuzzy Systems, supra note 14, at 470 (explaining concept of fuzzy sets whose blurred
boundaries allow partial members).
20 Zadeh, supranote 2, at 28.
21 Indeed, one of the central principles of Taoism is that apparent opposites are not only define but also
contain each other. The primary text of this philosophy, which is thought to have been authored by the
legendary Lao Tzu and to have appeared in written form about 240 B.C., observes that:
[T]ruly Being and Not-being grow out of one another;
Difficult and easy complete one another;
Long and short test one another;
High and low determine one another.
Pitch and mode give harmony to one another.
Front and back give sequence to one another.
THE WAY AND ITS POWER: A STUDY OF THE TAO TE CHING AND ITS PLACE IN CHINESE THOUGHT 143
(Arthur Waley trans., Grove Press 1958) (footnotes omitted). The traditional date for this collection of 81
brief passages is the sixth century B.C. See WING-TSIT CHAN, A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
137 (1963) which asserts that while some scholars have assigned fourth or third century B.C. date, there is
sufficient evidence to uphold sixth century B.C. date.
A translator of the writings of another Taoist sage has identified that the "key to Chuang Tzu's
thought is complementary opposites." THOMAS MERTON, THE WAY OF CHUANG Tzu 30 (1965). The
unification of apparent opposites is evoked most strongly in the following passage:
Tao [ie., the natural Way of life and harmony] is obscured when men understand
only one of a pair of opposites, or concentrate only on a partial aspect of being. Then
clear expression also becomes muddled by mere word-play, affirming this one aspect
and denying all the rest.
Hence the wrangling of Confucians and Mohists; each denies what the other
affirms, and affirms what the other denies. What use is this struggle to set up "No"
against "Yes," and "Yes" against "No"? Better to abandon this hopeless effort and
seek true light!
Right turns into wrong and wrong into right- the flow of life alters circumstances
and thus things themselves are altered in their turn. But disputants continue to affirm
and to deny the same things they have always affirmed and denied, ignoring the new
aspects of reality presented by the change in conditions.
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Zen's unique combination of mental and physical apprehension, one scholar has
The wise man therefore. . sees that on both sides of every argument there is
both right and wrong. He also sees that in the end they are reducible to the same thing,
once they are related to the pivot of Tao.
When the wise man grasps this pivot, he is in the center of the circle, and there
he stands while "Yes" and "No" pursue each other around the circumference.
The pivot of Tao passes through the center where all affirmations and denials
converge. He who grasps the pivot is at the still-point from which all movements and
oppositions can be seen in their right relationship. Hence he sees the limitless
possibilities of both "Yes" and "No." Abandoning all thought of imposing a limit or
taking sides, he rests in direct intuition.
Id. at 42-43.
22 See ZEN BUDDHISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF D.T. SUZUKI 60-61 (William Barrett
ed., Doubleday
Anchor Books 1956). Zen, the mingling of India's Buddhism and China's Taoism, is traditionally dated
from the arrival in China of the legendary Indian master Bodi-Dharma around 500 A.D. This school of
thought (or, more literally, of "no-thought") emphasizes direct perception, rather than a merely intellectual
understanding, of reality. Techniques used to achieve "enlightenment" include confronting apparent
dilemmas, such as in the contemplation of paradoxical koans (e.g., What is the sound of one hand
clapping?). Id. at 134.
The abandonment of opposites is a central feature of Zen:
Tai-Hui was a great [Zen master] of the twelfth century.... He used to carry a
short bamboo stick which he held forth before an assembly of monks, and said: "If
you call this a stick, you affirm; if you call it not a stick, you negate. Beyond
affirmation and negation what would you call it?"
Id. at 141.
The classic commentary on this koan indicates that it was posed by a master who:
intends to use [it] as a means to drive his disciples to the abyss of dualistic
contradictions, and expects them to find their way out, to be reborn with a completely
new point of view.

Be that as is may, so long as you live within the world of ordinary dualistic logic,
the question . . . can never be answered. Zen demands that you transcend this
contradiction, find a clear and definite way out, and be a person of real freedom.
ZENKEI SHIBAYAMA, ZEN COMMENTS ON THE MUMONKAN 300 (Sumiko Kudo, trans., Harper & Row
1974).
However, the famed "zen stick" is applied more directly to students whose display of such wisdom is
seen as premature:
When Yamaoka was a brash young student, he visited the master Dokuon.
Wanting to impress the master, he said:
"There is no mind, there is no body, there is no Buddha. There is no better, there
is no worse. There is no master and there is no student; there is no giving, there is no
receiving. What we think we see and feel is not real. All that is real is Emptiness.
None of these seeming things really exists."
Dokuon had been sitting quietly smoking his pipe, and saying nothing. Now he
picked up his staff, and without warning gave Yamaoka a terrible whack. Yamaoka
jumped up in anger.
"Since none of these things really exists," said Dokuon, "and all is Emptiness,
where does your anger come from? Think about it."
ZEN BUDDHISM; AN INTRODUCTION TO ZEN, WITH STORIES, PARABLES AND KOAN RIDDLES TOLD BY THE
ZEN MASTERS 59-60 (Peters Pauper Press 1959).

1998]

BRIGHT LINES OR BLURRY LABELS?

observed that the stick displays Zen's "persistent and often violent opposition to
words and then to the intellect which deals exclusively in words." 23 Indeed, formal
logic itself can be seen as a special case of fuzzy logic, in which truth values are
restricted to 0 and 1.
i.

Fuzzy Membership Function

In mathematical terminology, a fuzzy subset A of the "universe" or collection
X of individual member x's is characterized by their "membership function," A(x).
For each x in X, A(x) is equal to the degree of membership in of x in A.
To continue our example, we will let T be the fuzzy subset "tall people" of the
universe P of all people. For each person p in the universe P, the membership
function T(p) will produce the value of p's membership in the subset T.
Let us consider a smaller universe V of three judges (Judge 1, Judge 2, and
Judge 3), and assume that the membership function T(p) would produce the
following values for members of S:
T(Judge 1) = 0.8
T(Judge 2) = 0.7
T(Judge 3) = 0.5.
B. Bankruptcy Applications
Fuzzy logic provides a flexible means of defining in practice, concepts whose
numerical parameters are not specified by the Bankruptcy Code ("Code").
Variations in local practice may easily be incorporated, even if their own contours
are not exact.
1. Definitions
Compared to such statutes as the Internal Revenue Code, the Code can be
considered relatively "fuzzy."
In keeping with the equitable nature
of the
24•
25
24
bankruptcy court, the Code grants bankruptcy judges great discretion and other
than specifying various deadlines, imposes few absolute mathematical constraints
(e.g., the specific dollar amounts of federal exemptions in section 522(d)) on
23 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih, 3 PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST 25, 36 (1953).

24See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 454
n.I I (1977) (stating in exercising its summary jurisdiction, bankruptcy court is "a specialized court
equity"); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (noting bankruptcy courts are "essentially courts
equity"); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (explaining Supreme Court holding that "courts
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.").
25See, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (authorizing bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process,
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").

of
of
of
or
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debtors and creditors). 26However, the Code does contain many relative constraints,
whose exact parameters are set by the factual situation at issue. For example,
without specifying dollar amounts, section 547(b) generally enables the trustee or
debtor-in-possession to avoid "preferential" transfers that enable the transferee to
receive more than the transferee would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation.
Clearly, that amount, and thus the preference determination, is fact-sensitive.
Because the Code does not formally define many of its key expressions and
concepts, 27 courts seeking to use such terms have applied a range of hermeneutic
methods. They refer variously to: the use of the term or related terms in the law of
26 If time

constraints (i.e., "within 90 days") are omitted, the Code's statutory language includes relatively

few absolute mathematical specifications, either in terms of actual dollar limits (as in section 522(d)'s
specification of federal exemption allowances), non-monetary numbers (as in section 705's limitation of
creditor committee membership to no less than three nor more than eleven creditors), or specific
proportions (as in section 1 126(c)'s condition that at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of claims in a class vote to accept or reject a plan). Other Code sections that use mathematical
constraints include:
§ 101 (2)- definition of affiliate
§ 10 1(18)- definition of family farmer
§ 109(e)- eligibility for Chapter 13 protection
§ 303(b)- requirements for involuntary filing
§ 326(a)- limitation on compensation of trustee
§ 330(b)-(c)- compensation of trustee
§ 502(b)(6)(A)- allowance of claim for lease termination
§ 507- extent of priority claims
§ 522(d)- extent of federal exemptions
§ 523 (a) (2) (c) limitation of discharge for debts for "luxury
goods and services"
§ 547(c)(8)- restricting trustee's avoidance power on transfers for
consumer debts
§ 702- requirements for electing Chapter 7 trustee
§ 705- composition of creditors' committee
§ 727(a)(9)- exceptions to discharge where debtor filed a Chapter
12 or 13 plan within
previous six years.
§ 747(2)- subordination of certain customer claims in stockbroker
liquidation
§ 923- publication of notice of commencement of municipal
bankruptcy proceeding
§ 1102(b)- composition of creditors' committee
§ II 04(c)(2)- conditions for appointment of examiner
§ 11 12(e)- information to be provided for conversion to Chapter
7 case
§ 1114(1)- exception to application of Code provisions
concerning payment of insurance
benefits to retired employees
§ 11 26(c)-(d)- requirements for acceptance of plan
27 See Walter Effros, The Picture'sColorful, But Lacks Definition: An Undictionary of the Code, in NEW
JERSEY INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: FIFTEEN YEARS LATER

371-76 (1996) (listing alphabetically undefined terms, with accompanying citations from Circuit Courts of
Appeal).
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the relevant state or in other sections of the Code than those at issue; 29 the use of
the term in other statutes; 30 the legislative history of the Code section 3 1 or the
court's inference regarding what Congress meant; 32 the test 33 or "traditional
equitable definition"3 4 applied by other
courts; and the term's "established
35
decisions.
non-bankruptcy
from
meaning"
28 See, e.g., WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1007 (1st Cir. 1988)

(finding that although Code does not define "property,"whether something is property shall be determined
by state law); Billings v. AVCO Colo. Indus. Bank (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405, 406 (10th Cir. 1988)

(defining "purchase money security interest," in context of section 522(0 of Code, "the courts have
uniformly looked to the law of the state in which the security interest is created."); Avellino & Bienes v. M.
Frenville Co., Inc. (In re M. Frenville Co., Inc.), 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting Code does not

define when right to payment arises, "absent overrding federal law, is to be determined by reference to
state law.").
29 See, e.g., First City Beaumont v. Durkay (In re Ford), 967 F.2d
1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting

because Code does not define "contingent claim" for purposes of section 502(c)(1), court looks to judicial
definitions of "contingent" for other sections of the Code); Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L
Cartage Co., Inc.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir, 1990) (explaining although "transferee" is not defined by
section 550(a)(1) of Code, "transfer" is broadly defined in section 101(40) to include any disposition of an

interest in property); Begier v. I.R.S., 878 F.2d 762, 769 n.13 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating Code does not define
phrase, "property of the debtor" found in section 547(b), courts have looked to whether transferred
property may be defined as "property of the estate" under section 541).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.),
942 F.2d
1055, 1058 (6th Cir. 1991) (looking to Internal Revenue Code for definition of "tax" or "excise tax," which

are not defined in Code).

31See, e.g., University Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1075 n. 13 (3d

Cir. 1992) (understanding although Code does not define "executory contract" in section 365(a), its
legislative history states that term "generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some

extent on both sides"); Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp., 712 F.2d 962,967 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983)
(referring to legislative reports explaining section 541, and to Restatement of Trusts, 2d, § 2 in defining

"constructive trust" because term is not defined neither in Code nor by prior courts' interpretations of
Code).
32 See, e.g., Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,
292 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing
section 362(h) as incorporating chapter II proceeding and concluding that, although Code does not define
"individual" it is unlikely Congress intended to restrict remedies under this section to personal debtors);
Montello Oil Corp. v., Marin Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Main Motor Oil, Inc.), 740 F.2d 220,226 (3d Cir. 1984)
(noting since neither Code nor Uniform Commercial Code defines "demand," and in the absence of "[any]
other source of guidance, we must look to the policy behind section 546(c) to decide what the rule should
be"); McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating "in our view Congress cannot have
intended.., an interpretation" of section 544(a) that equates "knowledge," a term undefined in Code, with
"notice"); Foster v. Heitkamp (In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478, 489 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting term "provided for
by the plan" in section 1325(a)(5) is not defined by Code or its legislative history, "the intended meaning
seems clear enough").
33See, e.g., Rimell v. Mark Twain Bank (In re Rimmell), 946 F.2d 1363, 1365 (8th Cir. 1991) (adopting
Seventh Circuit's objective test for existence of "bona fide dispute" under section 303(b)(1)); Bartmann v.
Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopting objective test for existence of
"bona fide dispute" under section 303 (b)(i)).
34 See Willemain v. Kivitz (In re Willemain), 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th
Cir. 1985) (examining concept of
"good faith purchaser" in section 363(m) and adopting "traditional equitable definition" of this term).
35See, e.g., Andrews University v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740-41 (6th Cir. 1992)
(explaining since term "loan" not defined by Code, court looks to establish definition of term as adopted by
other circuit courts of appeal).
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Indeed, bankruptcy courts have themselves defined such equitable terms as the
"other cause" that justifies reopening a case under section 350(b). 36 Alternatively,
as with "shopping center" under section 365(b)(3), they have found that "the proper
definition of [an undefined term] is 'left to case-by-case interpretation.
As discussed below, 38 the application of the Code's terms, and possibly the
terms themselves, can be clarified by the principles of fuzzy logic. Central to this
inquiry is the determination of an appropriate membership function for the term in
question. In addition to taking into account the factors above, accurate calibration
of the membership function should include consideration of local practice.
a. Local Legal Culture
In a land whose population was markedly taller or shorter on average than
people elsewhere, both the crisp and the fuzzy definitions of "tall person" might
change. For example, in a culture where everyone was taller than was average
elsewhere, a "tall person" might be naturally defined as even taller than a "tall
person" elsewhere.
Similarly, local legal customs and practices can shift the parameters of
39
concepts critical to bankruptcy law. A growing body of empirical scholarship,
particularly in the area of consumer bankruptcy, has explored the genesis and
persistence of "local legal cultures," defined by Professors Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook as:
systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a
consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared
36See In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting decision to reopen a case for "other
cause" under section 350(b) lies within discretion of bankruptcy court).
37See In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Goldblatt Brothers,
Inc., 766 F.2d 1136, 1140 (7th Cir. 1985)).
31See Part II, infra.
39The seminal empirical work on consumer bankruptcy briefly discussed local legal culture in its
analysis of data gathered from a sample of those who had filed for bankruptcy in 1981. See TERESA
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY

AND CONSUMER CREDIT INAMERICA (1989). In an updated version of their study, considering filings made
in 1991, the same team concluded that:
The degree of stability evidenced by these data, in the face of a three-fold
increase in the number of debtors seeking bankruptcy during an economically volatile
decade of debt-driven boom and bust, is stunning. The rates of filing and the chapters
chosen within each of our [sample] districts, as well as nationally, remained almost
exactly the same. These facts seem to us to lend strong support to a theme we sounded

in the earlier study: that chapter choice is strongly affected by lawyer preferences, that
lawyers and judges are strongly influenced by a local legal culture in each district, and
that these local legal cultures are remarkably stable over long periods of time.
Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial
Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-91, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 143 (1994).
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by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and
differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a
similar formal legal regime.40

For example, this team observed significant differences, apparently unrelated
to the economic circumstances of debtors in different areas, among the• 4states,
in
1
the number of personal bankruptcy petitions filed per 100,000 population; among
4
the bankruptcy districts, in the choice of chapter 13 as an alternative to chapter 7;
and among the districts, in the choice and extent of repayment
43 in chapter 7 (by
reaffirmation agreements) and chapter 13 (by repayment plans).
These differences have been attributed to the local influence of judges (who set
attorneys' fees, as well as the procedures, for the two types of cases), lawyers (who
influence clients through their own advertising, beliefs, and degree of cooperation
or competition with other lawyers), trustees (who set procedures and administer
proceedings), local consumer credit counseling agencies (who help borrowers
decide if and when, and under what chapter, to file), and creditors themselves (who
select relatively aggressive or passive local lawyers, 44and who determine when to
object to different aspects of bankruptcy proceedings).
The influence of local culture adjusts such core, yet undefined, concepts as that
of "good faith." For example, because chapter 13 plans must provide for payment
to unsecured creditors for at least the amount that they would have received in the
chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor, 45 if a "no-asset" debtor has no non-exempt
assets to distribute in a chapter 7 proceeding she can theoretically
provide a "0%"
46
plan, which would not pay general unsecured creditors at all.
However, Professor Jean Braucher, who studied bankruptcy filings in Austin,
Dayton, Cincinnati and San Antonio, has noted that as a practical matter "chapter
13 trustees and judges in the[se] four cities effectively deter 0% plans and keep
most plans above a [widely varying] floor percent that is known to local
practitioners. The lawyers then respond by rarely or never submitting plans with

40Teresa A. Sullivan, et al.,
The Persistenceof Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence From the
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994).
41See id. at 818-22.
41 See id. at 822-30.
41See id. at 830-33.
Id.at 839-57. See also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 503 (1993) (exploring effect on local legal culture of pursuit of four goals by

lawyers representing consumer debtors: serving their clients' and their own financial interests and
attempting to fulfill some version of appropriate social role playing on the parts of their clients and
themselves).
41See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994).

46See, e.g., In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1968) (noting fact that plan provided for
nominal or zero payment to general unsecured creditors would not justify denial of chapter 13 plan).
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less than the specified percentage .... [I]n all four cities, lawyers can sometimes
get plans confirmed below the floor, if they convincingly establish inability of the
debtor to pay more."4 7 She speculates that this defacto
rule might be justified as "a
48
presumptive case of'good faith,"' under the Code.
In such a jurisdiction, a lawyer can define "good faith" in this context by a
function GF that operates over the range (0 percent to 100 percent) of possible
repayments to undersecured general creditors. Just as the tallness function T(p)
rose in figure 1 from 0 at 0 feet tall to 1 at six feet tall and remained at 1 for people
taller than six feet, so the function GF would generally rise from 0 for 0 percent
repayment to 1 at the local target percentage of such Chapter 13 repayments and
then remain at 1 for any percentage above that.
II. FUZZY SET OPERATIONS
It might be argued at this point that the apparatus of fuzzy logic has been
assembled for no greater purpose than to illustrate the variability possible among
interpretations of Code terms, which certainly could have been accomplished
without mathematical considerations.
However, the true value of fuzzy sets lies in their use in analyzing definitions
that themselves incorporate several fuzzy terms. This level of application involves
the union and intersection of fuzzy sets.
A. Unions and Intersections
1. Classical
Chief among the operations performed in the conventional theory of sets are
union and intersection.
a. Union
The union of two sets is the set containing all the members of each of the two
sets. For example, in the "universe" V of all people, the union of the set T of all
tall people and the set S of all slim people, expressed by the notation T U S, is the
set containing all people who are either tall or slim.

47 See Braucher, supra note 44, at 532.
49 Id. The floor percentages for routine

confirmation in Austin, Dayton, Cincinnati, and San Antonio
were, as noted by the respective chapter 13 standing trustees, 25-33 percent, 10 percent, 70 percent, and
100 (!) percent. See id.
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b. Intersection
On the other hand, the intersection of two sets is the set containing those items
that are members of both sets. The intersection of the set of all tall people and the
set of all slim people, expressed as T A S, is the set of all people who are bQh tall
and slim, i.e., the set of all tall slim people.
The "crispness" of these operations results from the sharp classification of any
person as either "tall" or "not tall," and as either "slim" or "not slim." For these
purposes, the members of any one of the resulting sets, for example, "tall slim
people," are further indistinguishable from each other by degrees of height or
slimness. The two sets and their union and intersection can thus be depicted as in
Figure 3.
If, in our example, we considered the "universe" consisting of Judges 1, Judge
2, and Judge 3, and found that only Judge 1 and 2 were "tall" and only Judges 2 and
3 were "slim," we could construct the diagram in Figure 4.
2.

Fuzzy

49

By contrast, as discussed above, fuzzy logic distinguishes degrees of tallness
and slimness by the membership functions T(p) and S(p), respectively.
For each person p in the universe V, there thus corresponds the descriptive list
or "ordered pair" D(p) of the two measurements, T(p) and S(p):
For each person p, D(p) = [T(p), S(p)]
For example, if the respective slimnesses of Judge 1, Judge 2, and Judge 3 are
taken as 0.6, 0.4, and 0.9, respectively, so that:

T(Judge 1) = 0.8
T(Judge 2) = 0.7
T(Judge 3) = 0.5

S(Judge 1) = 0.6
S(Judge 2) = 0.3
S(Judge 3) = 0.9

We then have:
D(Judge 1)= [0.8,0.6]
D(Judge 2) = [0.7, 0.3]
D(Judge 3) = [0.5, 0.9].

49 See

Bellman & Zadeh, supra note 14, at B-I 43-45 (providing brief introduction to fuzzy sets).
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By representing T(p) on the x-axis and S(p) on the y-axis, 50 we can chart the
respective representations of Judge 1, Judge 2 and Judge 3. See Figure 5.
Clearly, an individual person p could, depending on her degrees of membership
in classes T and S, be represented by a point anywhere within the box bordered by
the ordered pairs [0,0], [0,1], [1,0] and [1,1]. However, classical logic would
restrict each individual to one of these four points (corresponding to people who
short and heavy, short and slim, tall and heavy, and tall and
are, respectively,
51
slim).
In conventional set theory, unions and intersections are performed on the sets
containing the members p themselves (e.g., tall people, slim people), and result in
other collections of individuals. However, in fuzzy logic unions and intersections
operate on the corresponding D(p)'s, and result in new ordered pairs.
a. Fuzzy Union
The fuzy union of D(Judge 1), D(Judge 2) and D(Judge 3) is the class
containing the greatest degree of tallness and the greatest degree of slimness from
among these three judges, even if these degrees belong to different people. Since
the greatest degree of tallness among the judges is 0.8 (from Judge 1), and the
greatest degree of slimness is 0.9 (from Judge 3), the union of the three Judges is
[0.8, 0.9]. Among them, the judges best satisfy the "tallness" criterion to the
degree 0.8 and the "slimness" criterion to the degree 0.9.
b. Fuzzy Intersection
Conversely, the fzzy intersection of the three Judges represents the grates
common degr= to which the Judges belong to each of the fuzzy sets in question.
The intersection of the three judges would be 0.5 for tallness (Judge 3) and 0.3 for
slimness (Judge 2), or [0.5, 0.3].

C. Optimization
1. Classical
To find "tall slim judges" from among the limited set considered, in classical
logic we just isolated the tall and slim subsets of this "universe" and found their
intersection: that is, which members belonged to both.

5

0Of course, we

could reverse this order and put T(p) on the y-axis and S(p) on the x-axis.

51See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 29-34 (exploring this concept for three dimensions).
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2. Fuzzy
In fuzzy logic, however, the intersection of the universe members' degrees of
membership in the categories of "tall people" and "slim people" produced an
ordered pair which corresponded to none of the three judges. What, then, is the
optimal or "crisp" answer, which one judge maximizes the combination of
"tallness" and "slimness?"
One "straightforward" 52 means of choosing the optimal answer is to identify
the member of the universe that contributed the largest of the degrees of
membership to the intersection set. Similarly, another fuzzy logic textbook
proposes that "If the decision maker wants to have a 'crisp' decision proposal, if
seems appropriate to suggest to him the dividend which has the highest degree of
membership in the fuzzy set 'decision,"' as above. 53 That is, since Judge 3
contributed 0.5 (for tallness) and Judge 2 contributed only 0.2 (for slimness), and
0.5 is §reater than 0.2, Judge 3 is the closest to a "tall slim person" among the
judges.
3. Fuzzy Refinements
a. Additional Factors
Like classical logic, fuzzy logic can accommodate additional factors, through
the inclusion of additional membership functions to the description function.
For instance, the judges could be distinguished by their golfing ability by the
addition of the membership function g(p), whose value for any person p takes on a
value in the range from 0 (poor golfer) to I (excellent golfer). The description
function:
D(p) = [T(p), S(p)]
would be expanded to become:
D'(p) = [T(p), S(p), G(p)].
52See GEORGE J. KLIR & TINA A. FOLGER, FuzzY SETS, UNCERTAINTY, AND INFORMATION 256 (1988).

However, "[s]ince this method ignores information concerning any of the other alternatives, it may not be
desirable in all situations. Methods that [take such information into account] may therefore be used
instead." Id.

53H.J. ZIMMERMANN, Fuzzy SET THEORY- AND ITs APPLICATIONS 217 (1985). See also B.R. Gaines,
Foundationsof Fuzzy Reasoning, 8 INT. J.MAN-MACHINE STuDIEs 623, 637-38 (1976) (discussing same

principle).
"4 Presumably, if the highest degree of membership were shared by two or more judges, fuzzy logic
would consider which of those judges had the highest degree of membership in any of the remaining
categories.
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Of course, the inclusion of none, one, two, or three of the judges in the class of
"good golfers" could be accomplished by adding an additional circle to the Venn
diagrams of classical logic. (In fuzzy logic, the new criterion would literally add a
dimension to the analysis. The judges would be represented by points along three
axes, the mutually perpendicular x-, y-, and z-axis).
Clearly, with enough time, paper, and patience, an unlimited number of factors
can be added to the Venn diagram depiction, which itself remains two-dimensional.
By contrast, beyond three dimensions the fuzzy logic representations of the judges
could not be rendered graphically, since they would appear in "n-space," or an
imaginary "space" with the dimension n of factors in use.
b.

55
Weighting Factors

If the n criteria that the decision-maker applies are of unequal importance to
her, weighting factors, whose aggregate total must be 1, can be applied to each
criterion function. For example, if in the situation above the judges' tallness was of
prime importance and their slimness of relatively little significance the function
D(p) = [T(p), S(p)] could be recalibrated as:
D'(p)

=

(0.8) T(p) + (0.2) S(p)

As opposed to the optimization procedure above, the optimal choice of Judge p
will be the judge for which D'(p) is the greatest, or, in this case, Judge 1:
D'(Judge I)
D'(Judge 2)

=
=

(0.8)(0.8) + (0.2)(0.6) = .72
(0.8)(0.7) + (0.2)(0.3) = .62

D'(Judge 3) = (0.8)(0.5) + (0.2)(0.9) = .58
C. Bankruptcy Applications
The Code contains multi-prong tests, all of whose factors must be satisfied for
the test to be satisfied, 56 as well as multi-alternative tests, only one of whose
55See Bellman & Zadeh, supra note 14, at 149-50.
56

A classic example of a multi-prong test is the definition of a preference. Section 547(b) of the Code

allows the trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property

(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or an account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing o( the petition; or
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factors must be satisfied. 57 In addition, many of these factors are themselves multiprong or multi-alternative tests.
Generally, any single factor may be susceptible to fuzzy analysis. For
example, the multi-prong tests with one or more fuzzy factors can be analyzed as
intersections of fuzzy sets; and multi-alternative tests with one or more fuzzy
factors can be analyzed as unions of fuzzy sets.

1. "Undue Hardship"
An example of a fuzzy definition that can be expressed as the intersection of
fuzzy sets is the concept of "undue hardship" in the context of section
523(a)(8)(B), 5 which prohibits the discharge of an educational loan unless
"exempting such debt from discharge . . . will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents."
a. Eighth Circuit Test
Four Courts of Appeals have endorsed two separate tests for determining
"undue hardship." 60 First, the Eighth Circuit found that:
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
II U.S.C. § 547 (b) (1994).
57 See Section 363(0 allowing:
[t]he trustee may sell property... free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold
is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to
accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
II U.S.C. § 363(0.
" I I U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
60 See Cheeseman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheeseman), 25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir.
1994) (stating test was met and student loan was to be discharged); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 113637 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that minimal conditions of living must be met and considered as part of test to
ascertain there is undue hardship); Brunner v. New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that conclusion regarding legal effect of bankruptcy court's finding is needed to
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each bankruptcy case involving a student loan must be examined
on the facts and circumstances surrounding that particular
bankruptcy for the Court to make a determination as to "undue
hardship." The bankruptcy court must determine whether there
would be anything left from the debtor's estimated future income to
enable the debtor to make some payment on his/her student loan
without reducing what the debtor and61his/her dependents need to
maintain a minimal standard of living.
Clearly, the underlined concepts are fuzzy, in the sense that they are not likely
to be taken literally but rather as guidelines for an unenunciated and fact-sensitive
range of values. That is, despite the use of the words "anything" and "some," a
bankruptcy court presumably might find "undue hardship" even if the debtor's
estimated future income would allow the debtor to make a payment of 50 cents, or
one dollar, per month on the student loan without reducing the amount needed for a
minimal standard of living. Of course, if the debtor could spare $50 a month for
loan repayment without affecting her and her dependents' minimal standard of
living, the court would not be so sympathetic.
Instead of finding the exact amount at which the debtor's spare cash becomes
so significant as suddenly to constitute "something," fuzzy logic could create a
membership function F($) to model the substantiality of the debtor's free funds for
this purpose, with, say, F($0.50) = 0 and F($50) = 1.
Similarly, the question of whether such a payment would reduce the minimal
standard of living, and the assessment of the budget for that standard of living
itself, would turn on the court's assessment of the proposed plan to support this
standard. A lawyer experienced in consumer bankruptcies could probably
construct a fuzzy model of the budget for the family in question, by adding fuzzy
financial figures representing the costs of various items for each affected person.
Finally, the estimation of the debtor's future income invites ambiguity. The
completed fuzzy model of "undue hardship" under the Eight Circuit standard might
involve a membership function of the following type:
A(plan) = [F(standard of living), G(future income),
H(amount payable)]
where A(plan) is the acceptability to the court (from 0, unacceptable, to 1,
acceptable, of a given plan proposed by the debtor), F(standard of living) is the
determine whether "undue hardship" was imposed); Andrews v. South Dakota Standard Loan Assistance
Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that living expenses must be taken
into consideration).
61 Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704 (quoting In re Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981))
(emphasis added).
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acceptability to the court of the minimal standard of living identified by the debtor
as appropriate, G(future income) is the acceptability of the debtor's estimate of
future income, and H(amount payable) is the substantiality of the amount the
debtor calculates will be available, with the above variables set as indicated, to
repay the loan.
In estimating the possible success of an "undue hardship" argument, the debtor
and her attorney will estimate the value of these functions for different values of
the variables, attempting to optimize the membership of the plan in the set of
acceptable plans.
b. Second Circuit Test
A similarly fuzzy approach, with the addition of functions for "persistence" and
"good faith," can be taken to the Second Circuit's three-part test for "undue
hardship." 62 which was advanced six years after the Eighth Circuit's test:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likly to
persist for a significan portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and
(3) that the debtor has made god faith efforts to
63
loans.
the
repay
This test was adopted six years later by the Seventh Circuit, which explicitly
rejected a rival three-part test applied by the bankruptcy court and the district
court. 64 Most recently, the Sixth Circuit declined to champion one test over the
62

See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (adopting standard set forth in district court's unpublished opinion)

(emphasis
added).
63
1d.
6 See Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that Seventh Circuit found redundant
section 3(a), and improper section 3(b), of the policy test enunciated by the bankruptcy court in In re

Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532, 544 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1979):

(1) Mechanical Test: The court must ask: Will the debtor's future financial resources
for the longest foreseeable period of time allowed for the repayment of the loan be
sufficient to support the debtor and his dependent[s] at a subsistence or poverty
standard of living, as well as to fund repayment of the student loan?
(2) Good Faith Test: Here, the court asks two questions:
(a) Was the debtor negligent or irresponsible in his efforts to minimize expenses,
maximize resources or secure employment?
(b) If "yes," then would lack of such negligence or irresponsibility have altered
the answer to the mechanical test?
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other, since, although the bankruptcy court had not specified which of the tests it
was following in finding "undue hardship" to the debtor, the loans in question were
dischargeable
"under any hardship test the court may have used in reaching its
65
decision."
2.

"Plain Language" Yardsticks

Although the Supreme Court has recently appeared to endorse the "plain
meaning" of Code sections at issue, 66 commentators have questioned whether this

(3) ... Policy Test: The court must ask: Do the circumstances- i.e., the amount and
percentage of the total indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects
of the petitioner indicate:
(a) That the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to discharge the
student debt, or
(b) That the debtor has definitely benefited financially from the education which
the loan helped to finance?
65 Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356,
359 (1994).
6These decisions include, in chronological order:
See, e.g., United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) (stating "statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor"). Justice Scalia's opinion for
unanimous Court nonetheless found legislative history and policy considerations of little moment in
concluding that undersecured creditors are not entitled to compensation under section 362(d)(i) for delay
automatic stay causes in their foreclosing on collateral. See id;
U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989) (explaining legislative history is relevant only
if Code section is susceptible to reasonable interpretation that clearly conflicts with important state or
federal legislation);
Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990) (stating "statutory
interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself" and in determining that restitution payments
imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal actions are dischargeable in chapter 13 proceedings);
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1991) (finding plain language of Code dictates that chapter
11 protection is available to individual debtors);
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991) (explaining fact that Congress may not have foreseen
all consequences of Code revision is not sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 415 (1992) (finding that in "allowed secured claim" of section
506(d) "term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.");
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (stating that plain meaning of Bankruptcy
Rules' deadlines on filing objections to exemptions "may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt
parties to act and they produce finality.");
Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 406(1992) (reading text of section 547(c), closely, to hold that
"date of honor" rather than "date of delivery" rule applies for purposes of calculating preference period for
transfer by check);
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 755-56 (1992) (finding that under plain language of Code,
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
for purposes of section 541(c)(2) exclusions);
Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (stating
"excusable neglect" standard of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) for allowing late filing of documents should not
be construed rigidly, but in light of circumstances of situation);
Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331 (1993) (barring lien-stripping in chapter 13
proceedings, under "plausible" interpretation of section 1322(b)(2));
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hermeneutic technique is itself dispositive. 67 Not only does the disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals indicate a fundamental ambiguity in the language in
question, but6 the Court's method for obtaining "plain meaning" may itself be
inconsistent. 8
It has been suggested that despite the Court's announced agenda of adhering to
the "plain meaning" of specific Code provisions, in actually interpreting
subsections the Justices "incorporat[ed] material from six realms of relevance, each
progressively more inclusive and farther removed from the literal meaning of the
code section in question [and containing] inherent ambiguities and
contradictions."69
Specifically, the language of a Code subsection can be evaluated in the
contexts of:
1. The language itself, "in a vacuum;"
2. The Code section containing the subsection at issue;

Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 465 (1993) (indicating that plain language of Code dictates that
postpetition interest be allowed to holders of oversecured home mortgages that did not explicitly provide
for such interest);
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (concluding under
section 548(a)(2)(A), "reasonably equivalent value" of property sold at noncollusive, procedurally
correct foreclosure sale is foreclosure sale price itself).
67 See, e.g., Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving 'Plain
Meaning' Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1636, 1748 (1993) (stating
"[a]lthough ostensibly a significant step towards judicial predictability, the 'plain meaning' approach has
proven to be less a cohesive, coherent method of statutory interpretation than a loose collection of
principles, which themselves may often be breached."); Susan Block-Lieb, Bankruptcy Decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States During the 1991-1992 Term, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER I (Aug.
1992) ("just when the language of a statute is "plain" is unclear); Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of
Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
823, 880 (1991) (noting recent emphasis on textualism has led to "the lack of a consistent jurisprudence in
the Court's bankruptcy decisions.... [Tihe Rehnquist Court appears to drift from bankruptcy decision to
bankruptcy decision."). Cf Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH U. L.Q. 535, 565 (1993) (explaining textualist approach
produces better consequences that would overt use of dynamic interpretation; moreover, changes from
textualist to "dynamic interpretation" approach would not necessarily produce dramatic shifts in outcome
of Court's bankruptcy decisions); Adam J.Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the
Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1858 (1991) (reasoning that consistent use of
textualist approach reduces uncertainty over how bankruptcy courts will decide issues and develops "bright
line rules").
6 See, e.g., Effross, supra note 67, at 1747-58 (identifying six levels of ambiguity in "plain meaning"
analysis).
69Id. at 1749. Cf Frankfurter, supra note 1,at 529 (stating "1 should say that the troublesome phase of
[statutory] construction is the determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and external
circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink
discernible to the judicial eye.").
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3. Different Code sections containing (or omitting) the same or similar
language;
4. The policies behind the Code;
5. The policies behind other statutes; and
6. Equitable considerations.

70

A fuzzy model of Code interpretation, which could be used either to estimate
the acceptability of a given interpretation or to model the Court's precedent
concerning such interpretations, could include an "interpretive strength" function
that incorporated six membership functions, each corresponding to the
acceptability in one of these six contexts of a given interpretation of a Code
subsection. For a given interpretation i, the acceptability of the interpretation could
be gauged as, B(i) = [Sl(i), S2(i), S3(i), S4(i), S5(i), S6(i)], where SI(i) is the
support (from 0, complete contradiction, to 1, complete support) that the first
category of interpretation (language in a vacuum) adds to the interpretation, S2(i) is
the support added by the second category, and so on.
For example, Rule 9006(b)(1) allows a bankruptcy court "at any time in its
discretion" to allow, upon motion, an act to be done or notice to be given past the
formal deadline for such act or notice, "where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect."7 ' In Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.
Partnership,
the Court construed "excusable neglect" broadly, to include
circumstances in which the movant had not been the victim of uncontrollable
circumstances. The Court held that "the determination is at bottom an equitable
one, taking account of all the relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission,
including "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within 74the reasonable control of the movant, and whether
the movant acted in good faith.,
In affirming the fuzziness of "excusable neglect" and identifying some of its
components, the Court cited a collegiate dictionary's definition of "neglect"75 and
70 See, e.g., Effross, supra note 67, at 1754 (discussing class of plain meaning of Code and equitable

considerations).
7' FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).

72 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (stating "Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted

where appropriate to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by
intervening circumstances beyond the party's control.").
73
d. at 395.
74id.
75 Id. at 388 (defining neglect as "simple, faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions
caused by carelessness").
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also the expansive construction of "excusable neglect" in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus, the membership of this interpretation in the set of acceptable
interpretations might be seen as
B(i) = [ 1, .5, .5, .5, 1, 1].

However, the four-Justice dissent cited a standard legal dictionary's entry for
"excusable neglect," which focused on the circumstances leading up to the missed
deadline rather than the consequences of the failure to meet the deadline. 77 The
dissent bolstered this view with the observation that Rule 9006(b)(1) by its own
terms requires that "unless
the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect
78
relief is unavailable.,
To reflect this disagreement, a new function, B'(i), could be derived to indicate
the acceptance of a given interpretation i by the entire court; in this example, the
dissent's opposed view of the Rule's "plain meaning" would lower the first
component of B(i) from I to some lesser number. (The simplest way would be to
assign each Justice a weight of. 11, or 1/9; since the Rule's own language led five
Justices to vote for, and four against, the interpretation in question, the first
component of B(i) would thus be 5/9, or .55.)
79
3. Principles vs. Rules

The fuzzy view of legal decision-making efficiently incorporates the
distinction made by Ronald Dworkin between the strictness of rules ("A debtor
may not file a Chapter 7 petition more than once in six years") and the relative
flexibility of the underlying principles, which may themselves conflict ("Debtors
are entitled to a 'fresh start"'; "Debtors should not be allowed to abuse the
bankruptcy process by certain types of-repeated filings."). A membership function
is rule-like in that it, and its component functions, assign specific values to the
satisfaction of specific criteria; yet the effect and interplay of the principles are
given effect by the relative weights given to the component functions before the
optimization process begins.
76See id.at 391-93 (explaining that under FED. R. Civ. PRO. 6(b), 13(f), and 60(b)(6) "excusable
neglect" extends to inadvertent delays).
77See, e.g. PioneerInv. Servs., 507 U.S. at 402 (noting definition of "excusable neglect" as "a failure to
take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or
willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable

hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the
adverse party.") (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
7sId. (emphasis added).
79See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1994) (prohibiting discharge where "the debtor has been granted a
discharge under this section, under section 1141 of this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the
Bankruptcy
Act ...").
s See generally RONALD DwoRmIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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Indeed, Bart Kosko sees the legal process not as a "decision tree," in which the
interlocking of facts with successive rules leads inexorably to a legal conclusion,
but as a set of simultaneous balances, through which the judge fits fuzzy facts to
the relevant principles, each of which carries a certain weight. "The judge weighs
the principles and cites case precedents to back up the weights. He states that the
judge does not give the weights
as numbers- at least today a judge does not- but
82
they are a matter of degree."
III. Fuzzy DECISION-MAKING

83

Both classical and fuzzy decision theory are geared towards selecting the one
that produces the maximum utility from a group of alternatives. If the alternatives
are represented on the x-axis and the corresponding utilities on the y-axis, the
correspondence of alternatives to utilities can be represented linguistically as "If x,
then y."
Classical decision theory, then, seeks to find whichever x maximizes y.
However, fuzzy decision theory places an independent utility on the
appropriateness of the choice of x itself, and seeks simultaneously to maximize the
choice of x and y. This approach, while in its own way creating applications for
bankruptcy law, leads to the crucial development of fuzzy rules, examined in Part
IV, below.
A. Introduction
Decision theory selects from a set of alternatives, subject to a set of constraints
on the choice between different alternatives, the alternative whose uilit or
performance, as determined by a performance Qr utiliy function, is the closest to
the specified goa.S One analysis of fuzzy decision-making has concluded that
under conditions of risk "there is no longer an optimum policy but a class of
85
optimum policies with varying degrees of risk."

81See, e.g., KOSKO, supra note 5, at 178-80 (discussing how judges weigh all principals involved in
deciding cases).
82See id. at 180.
83See generally Bellman & Zadeh, supra note 14, at B-147-50 (describing decision making in fuzzy
environment).
84The decisions addressed here are those made under conditions of certainty, where "the decision maker
knows which state of nature to expect and he chooses the decision alternative with the highest utility, given
the prevailing state of nature," as opposed to the more difficult situation of deciding "under risk," where
"he does not know exactly which state will occur, but he only knows a probability function of the states."
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 53, at 213.
83Sheldon S.L. Chang, On Risk and Decision Making in a Fuzzy Environment, in FUZZY SETS AND THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO CoGNrTvE AND DECISION PROCESSES, 219-226, at 219 (Lotfi Zadeh et al eds.. 1975).
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For example, a law student returning to her apartment faces a goal: to have the
dinner most conducive to her studying for two hours and then going to sleep. She
may face the following constraints on alternatives: she does not have enough cash
to send out for food, she is too tired to go out to the automatic teller machine and
then, if she does not go out, the store is too crowded or too far to drive to. Thus,
her alternatives are confined to what is in her refrigerator: leftover pizza, a cake,
and five apples. Deciding that the utility of the pizza (which might keep her from
falling asleep easily) and the cake (which might make her too sleepy to study) are
low, that eating three of the apples would leave her too hungry and all five, too full,
the student decides to eat four apples for dinner.
B. ConventionalDecision Theory

86

More generally, many problems in decision theory lend themselves to
modeling along x-y axes. The different alternatives, such as an amount of money
to invest in a given opportunity are usually represented by various values of x,
which occur over an interval (say, between 0 and 10). The relevant performance or
utility function matches or "maps" each of these values of x to a corresponding yvalue. The goal is usually to find either the alternative (value of x) that will
maximize utility (y) or to find the alternative that corresponds to a given
performance or utility level (value of y).
A simple example of such an approach involves the degree to which the law
student can study for an exam three days away. The set of alternatives, X, consists
of all values from 0 (no time spent studying) to 72 hours (100% of the time
studying).
The performance function (which will not be specified here), as reflected in the
y value associated with each x value, indicates that up to a certain point increasing
study provides benefit, but that further study will produce87decreasing (and, at some
point, as the student foregoes sleep, even lower) benefits.
In this standard approach to decision-making, the constraints on the value of x
are non-fuzzy: that is, they are of the form, "x is any amount between 0 and 72."
The performance function takes values of x and maps them into values of y. In
other words, the problem is reduced to finding the appropriate value (goal) of y
(performance or utility) across all relevant x's (alternatives, subject to constraints).
The goal can be crisp, such as, "find the best amount of time [i.e., the amount
of time x that produces the greatest utility y] to study [between 0 and 72 hours]."
The goal can also be fuzzy: "find an amount of time that I need to study to achieve
86 See Bellman & Zadeh, supra note 14, at B-147-48 (stating that "[iln the conventional approach the
performance function associated with a decision process serves to define a linear ordering on the set of
alternatives.").
87 See Figure 6.
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a proficiency in the vicinity of 70% of my maximum." In either case, however,
conventional decision-making is indifferent to the relative values of choosing
among different alternatives (values of x) so long as the appropriate goal (value of
y) is achieved.
88

C. Fuzzy Decision Theory

By contrast, fuzzy decision-making treats not only the goal (y-value) but also
the constraints (x-values) as fuzzy. That is, to each alternative x corresponds not
only a y-value, U(x), for the utility of x, but also a constraint value, C(x), for the
constraint value of x. Thus, there is a function F such that for each alternative x,
F(x) = [U(x), C(x)]. In other words, goals (restrictions8 9on y) and constraints
(restrictions on x) are treated the same, or "symmetrically."
For the student who recognizes that 7 hours of sleep per night is necessary and
who has other unavoidable commitments in the week before the examination, the
alternative times to study themselves become fuzzy. The student may say, "I want
to master about 80% of the material but I also want to study somewhere around 35
hours."
In effect, while the student applying conventional decision theory is solving the
single equation, U(x) = y for a specified value of y, the student applying fuzzy
logic is finding the x that has highest degree of belonging both to U(x) and C(x),
which may appear as in Figure 7.
The intersection of these two functions of x will provide the appropriate set of
times that could be used to study, and the optimization function here is used to
select the best.
D. Fuzzy Decision-MakingRefinements
Beyond the limited scope of this paper, there are fuzzy logic techniques for the
optimization of choices by means other than the technique described in Part II. B,
above. The basis of a popular method, is to take the "mean" or "center of gravity"

"8See generally KLR & FOLGER, supra note 53, at 255-57; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 53, at 213-57;
Bellman & Zadeh, supra note 14, at B-148-49 (defining fuzzy decision as "the fuzzy set of alternatives
resulting from the intersection of the goals and constraints.").
89 See Lotfi A. Zadeh, The Calculus of Fuzzy Restrictions, in FUZZY SETS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS TO
COGNmvE AND DECISION PROCESSES I (Lotfi A. Zadeh et al, eds., 1975). The author discusses in detail
concept of fi=zx restriion [such as "young"]. See id. A fuzzy relation that acts as an elastic constraint on
the values that may be assigned to a variable is an example. See id. Such restrictions appear to play an
important role in human cognition, especially in situations involving concept formation, pattern
recognition, and decision-making in fuzzy or uncertain environments.
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of the set of points in n-dimensional space that correspond to various alternatives
available to satisfy n different criteria.
Nor does this discussion consider the substantial literature that has evolved
concerning the fuzzy modeling of decisions made by more than one person ("nperson game theories"), beyond noting that a distinction is made between situations
in which different decision-makers with different goals consider the same
information and independently arrive at different utility rankings of the alternatives
("group theories of decision-making") and situations in which the decision-makers
share a goal but each have access to a different subset
of the information relevant
9
to the decision ("team theories of decision-making"). 1
E. Bankruptcy Applications
As noted, the chief application to bankruptcy law of fuzzy decision theory may
be in the construction of fuzzy rules, which are discussed in Point V below.
IV. FuzzY RULES/ALGORITHMS/CONTROLLERS

Fuzzy controllers combine fuzzy rules and fuzzy algorithms, themselves
amalgams of fuzzy definitions, fuzzy sets, and fuzzy decision theory, into a
coherent system that extracts specificity from overlapping ambiguities.
The chief advantages of fuzzy controllers, which have corresponding benefits
to those seeking to model legal rules, are their abilities: (1) to approximate
complex mathematical relationships by the conglomeration of relatively simple
mathematical rules; (2) to "blend" or average contradictory rules efficiently; and
(3) to incorporate more, fewer, or changed rules as the situation and the available
information demand.
A. Conventional Control Theory
Traditional control theory simulates the actions of an expert (for instance, an
expert temperature regulator) by precise mathematical models. In developing
advanced control systems, however, the use of mathematical models can be costly
and computationally complex. This analytical approach is even more difficult
when dealing with uncertainty such as "too much," "too little," "frequently," or

90See, e.g., KoSKO, supra note 5, at 173-74; MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 5, at 112-14.

91See KLiR & FOLGER, supra note 52, at 257-58; see also L.W. Fung and K.S. Fu, An Axiomatic
Approach to RationalDecision Making in a Fuzzy Environment, in FuzzY SETS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
TO COGNITIVE AND DECISION PROCESSES 227-256 (Lotfi A. Zadeh et al, eds., 1975) (deducing, from two

alternative sets of axioms, conclusions concerning group decision-making).
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"quite often," which are commonly handled by human experts in industrial control
92
processes.
B. Fuzzy Control Theory
1. Basics
By contrast, by employing loosely defined variables as "tall"
and "fast," fuzzy controllers enable: "air conditioners, washing
machines and other devices [to] judge how fast they should operate
or shift from one setting to another even
when the criteria for
93
making those changes are hard to define."
Afizzy algorithm has been defined as:
an algorithm in which some of the instructions are fuzzy in nature.
Examples of such instructions are:
(a) Increase x slightly if y is slightly larger than 10; (b) Decrease u
until it becomes much smaller than v; (c) Reduce speed if the road
is slippery. The sources
of fuzziness in these instructions are the
94
underlined words.
A fuzzy system is a collection of fuzzy algorithms. Bart Kosko has described a
three-step process for constructing such a system by stating:
First, you pick the nouns or "variables." Call these X and Y. X
is the input to the system. Y is the output .... If X, then Y....
Second, you pick the fuzzy sets. We define fuzzy subsets of the
nouns X and Y ....Third, you pick the fuzzy rules [, associating
95
various subsets of X with various subsets of Y] ....
For example, to automate the operation of a rotary cement kiln, two alternative
systems were derived from discussions with human operators: one involved 75

92 See

FUTURE COMPETrTVENESS, supra note 10, at 5. See Figure 10.

93Kosko & Isaka, supra note 4, at 76. These authors also observe that fuzzy controllers have been used

in subway trains, washing machines, cameras and camcorders, vacuum cleaners, automobiles, and model
helicopters. See id. at 78-80. See also FUTURE CoMPETITvENEss, supra note 10, at 14-15, 19-22, and 37
(enumerating and discussing fuzzy logic control-based products developed by Japanese industry).
94See ZADEH, Fuzzy Systems, supra note 14, at
485.
" See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 161.
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fuzzy rules and9616 fuzzy variables, and the other involved 13 fuzzy rules and 12
fuzzy variables.
2. The Fuzzy Air Conditioner
The prototypical fuzzy controller, described at length by Kosko, 97 is the fuzzy
air conditioner.
a. Variables
In this application, the input, or X, is the temperature of a room, and the output,
or Y, is the speed of the air conditioner's motor.
b. Fuzzy Subsets
The fuzzy subsets of temperature are defined for the example as follows:
"cold" (50 degrees and cooler), "cool" (40-65 degrees), "just right," (60-70
degrees), "warm" (65-85 degrees) and "hot" (greater than 80 degrees). Graphically,
these categories are represented as in Figure 8.
The fuzzy subsets of motor speed are: "stop" (0 to 30 revolutions per minute),
"slow" (10-50 r.p.m.), "medium" (40-60 r.p.m.), "fast" (50-90 r.p.m.), and "blast"
(greater than 70 r.p.m.). These categories are represented as in Figure 9.
The fuzzy subsets of both temperature and speed take the form of isosceles
triangles with bases spanning the range of temperature or r.p.m. Setting the height
of the triangle for any temperature (or r.p.m. setting) corresponds to the degree,
from 0 to 1, that that temperature (or setting) is a member of the specified subset.
For example, 0, 55, 65, and 75 degrees belong with degree 1 to "cold," "cool," "just
right," and "warm," respectively; and 50 and 60 degrees each belong with degree .5
to the fuzzy subset, "cool."
Notably, because the triangles overlap, some temperatures (and r.p.m. settings)
are members of two different fuzzy subsets. The r.p.m. setting of 25 belongs with
degree 0.3 to "stop" and also with degree 0.6 to "cold."
96See P. Martin Larsen, IndustrialApplications of Fuzzy Logic Control, in FUZZY REASONING AND ITS
APPLICATIONS 335, 337-38 (E.H. Mamdani and B.R. Gaines eds., 1981) (describing two fuzzy logic
control projects on rotors cement kiln). The first use of a fuzzy controller for the operation of a cement kiln
occurred in 1980. See Kosko & Isaka, supra note 4, at 76; see also KOSKO, supra note 5, at 184-87
(providing "1992 list of fuzzy products in Japan and North Korea," including air conditioners, cameras,
copy machines, dishwashers, elevator controls, humidifiers, microwave ovens, refrigerators, televisions,
video camcorders, and washing machines).
97 See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 161-66, 171-75. The following discussion and diagrams of this

programming and operation of a fuzzy air conditioner follow Kosko's exposition. See id.
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c. Fuzzy Rules
The fuzzy rules, which match fuzzy subsets of temperature with fuzzy subsets
of speed, are simple:
Rule 1: If the temperature is cold, the motor speed
stops.
Rule 2: If the temperature is cool, the motor speed
slows.
Rule 3: If the temperature is just right, the motor
speed is medium.
Rule 4: If the temperature is warm, the motor speed
is fast.
Rule 5: If the temperature is hot, the motor speed
blasts.
The rules, which themselves overlap, are represented graphically in Figure 10,
with temperature (input) on the x-axis and motor speed (output) on the y-axis.
Associated with any temperature is either one rule or two overlapping rules (each
of which is partially triggered).
C. Bankruptcy Applications
1. Fraudulent Transfers
In examining the circumstances under which intercorporate guaranties
constitute fraudulent conveyances, Professor Jack Williams has proposed a fuzzy
model of the Code's multi-alternative definition of fraudulent transfer, because:
[t]he binary logic of modem paradigms of the law falls
short when describing the vagueness of the real world. A
formal approach to fraudulent transfer law has reduced the
system to a succession of statements that are either true or
false, yes or no. Adequate value is either present, or it is
not. A debtor is either insolvent, or it is not. A transfer or
obligation is either fraudulent, or it is not . . . The
[proposed] model rejects the predominant contemporary
fraudulent transfer paradigms because of their bivalent
nature.

98

Professor Williams focused on Section 548(a)(2), which allows the trustee to
avoid obligations for which the debtor:
98 Williams, supra note 6, at 1406.
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(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent valu
in exchange... ; and
(B)(i) was insolven on the date that . . . such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
obligation .... 99
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 00 and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act' 0 ' are similar provisions.
Of particular interest to our discussion is this commentator's introduction of
fuzziness to clarify the concept of insolvency. From the three statutes in question,
Williams isolated seven different methods of assessing insolvency of the debtor
guarantor, each involving a different permutation of inclusion or rejection of the
value of the contingent liability assumed by the debtor (either ignored, included at
present or discounted value, and/or included with or without discounting for
probability of its occurrence, or included at discounted value limited to asset value
of guarantor) and the value of the equitable rights of exoneration, reimbursement,
subrogation, and contribution granted0 2to the guarantor (ignored, or included at
discounted value, or at present value).'
Instead, he proposed a fuzzy new model of calculating insolvency for the
purpose of fraudulent transfers:
(1) [I]f the guaranty is absolute and unconditional then, it
should be treated as a liability
at the face amount of the guaranty
3
less any payments made.1
(2) If the guaranty is a type other than absolute and
unconditional . . . the court should determine the subjective
probability of the guaranty being called based on the facts and
circumstances known, or should have been known,
by the parties at
04
the time the guaranty obligation was incurred.'
(a) If the probability that the guaranty will be called is
greater than fifty percent, then the full amount of the outstanding
indebtedness should be realized as a liability.' 0 5 In this case, the
court should conduct a fact-sensitive investigation into the value of
99 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added); see Williams, supra note 6, at 1406, 1411 (describing

fraudulent transfer law).
10"UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a) (1985); see also Williams, supra note 6, at 1411
n.28 (quoting UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT).
101 UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §4 (1985), quoted in Williams, supra note 6, at 1410 n.24.
102See Williams, supra note 6, at 1442-45 (explaining different approaches to equitable rights).
03 Id. at 1463.
104Id.

'os Id. at 1464.
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the equitable rights that the guarantor can count as assets to offset
the liability under the guarantee.
(b) If the probability that the guaranty will be called is less
than or equal to fifty percent, then the guaranty liability should be
valued at zero.106
The chief advantage claimed for the fuzziness of this model is that it simplifies
the prevailing standard, under which the court set a probability value (from 0
percent to 100%) on the contingency's occurring, and then valued the amount of the
contingency by multiplying this number by the amount that would be owed by the
debtor (whether or not the debtor had assets to pay). 10 7 Williams also notes:
The contemporary models, however, seek precision at the
expense of clarity. In assessing the probability that the guaranty
will be called, courts attempt to fix an exact probability- five
percent, thirty percent, seventy-eight percent. One court concluded
that the probability the guaranty would be called was 1.7%. Why
not 1.8%, or 1.6? Courts deceive themselves if they believe they
can make such fine distinctions. Moreover, courts mislead
themselves if they believe 10fraudulent
transfer law requires the
8
attain.
to
seek
they
exactitude
2.

Plain Language: Heuristics and Hermeneutics
In a 1992 article, (then-)Judge Stephen Breyer identified:
five different circumstances in which courts might turn to
legislative history for help in interpreting a statute: (1) avoiding an
absurd result; (2) preventing the law from turning on a drafting
error; (3) understanding the meaning of specialized terms; (4)
understanding the "reasonable purpose" a provision might serve;
and (5) choosing among several possible "reasonable
purposes" for
09
language in a politically controversial law.1

1

I06d.

107See Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1992) (modifying
previous model by including contingent liability with equitable rights both at discounted value); see also
Williams, supranote 6, at 1446 (discussing Covey decision).
'os Williams, supranote 6, at 1464 (footnote omitted).
109Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845,
860-61 (1992).
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If these five categories were seen as (slightly) overlapping fuzzy sets ranged
along the spectrum of justifications for the use of legislative history, ranging from
least (#1) to most (#5) controversial, they could serve as the "input" for a fuzzy
controller whose "output" would be a specified degree of use of legislative history.
These fuzzy sets might include the six interpretive contexts identified above, with
one added for the use of legislative history. The temperature/r.p.m. axes of
Kosko's air conditioner could be replaced by justification/interpretive technique.
This controller would not only allow the Court to model its choice of
appropriate technique but would possibly enable it to "control" the interpretation of
future questions in the same manner as the air conditioner seeks one stable
temperature.
3. Rules vs. Standards
To some extent, the "fuzzy controller" view of law addresses the dissatisfaction
expressed by exponents of Critical Legal Studies movement ("CLS") with the loose
mix of specific rules and more flexible standards that are applied by courts and
lawyers to solve legal problems."1 0 In fuzzy logic, a rule is a narrow fuzzy set and a
standard a wide fuzzy set. Both can be used at the same time, and the dividing line
between them j vague.III
10See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 20-49 (1987) (summarizing CLS
objections). The CLS objectionism, as enumerated by Kelman, are:
(1) that "the legal system simultaneously embraces doctrines that allow any
particular case to be decided as if either the rule-like decision mode or the standardlike one were in force." Id. at 20.
(2) that rules can be overinclusive or underinclusive, and that standards can be
applied arbitrarily or prejudicially. Id. at 40.
(3) that the specificity of rules allows them to be evaded by clever actors, while
the flexibility of standards leads to surprise and inefficiency when people are not sure
how they will be applied in their case. Id. at 40-43..
(4) that "[it is possible to establish legal rules, increasingly detailed in covering
available cases, that can become mechanically applicable to the vast bulk of actual
controversies, but practice may well become settled only at the cost of principled
doctrine becoming chaotic." Id. at 46. That is, "citizens cannot conceivably know their
precise obligations if they are not apparent from a knowledge of a short list of clear
principles." KELLMAN, at 47.
(5) that "while official discretion may be restrained in particular cases, the sense
of arbitrariness and horizontal inequity that is supposedly limited by containing
discretion runs wild when meaningless factual distinctions govern outcomes." Id.
(6) that there is "the possibility that the invocation of a clear rule in one area may
not be counterbalanced by a conflicting rule or standard that actors in the system see
as arising in the same field, but as 'corrected' in what is generally seen as a separate
domain.... [and] that complete legal relief depends not simply on the application of a
rule but on vague standard as well." Id. at 48-49.
See Williams, supra note 6, at 1458-59 providing that:
In fuzzy systems, rules and standards may coexist in the same set. Fine rules allow
small patches of discretion. Sloppy rules or standards allow large patches of
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V. FUZZY EXPERT SYSTEMS

After suggesting that "in the future we may have good cheap legal advice on a
chip," Professor Kosko almost immediately
added that "lawyers . . . on a chip
112
would weave a more tangled legal web."
Behind this proposal is the idea that law can be reduced to an "expert system,"
which consists of: a database to which can be added factual information about the
situation at hand; a knowledge base, consisting of a number of fuzzy "if-then"
rules derived from existing statutes and legal precedents, and an "inference engine"
that combines the facts and rules to produce an answer.113
However, in keeping with the spirit of direc experience that underlies fuzzy
logic's philosophical forebears, we should remember the Taoist wheelwright who
placed little value on books written by "experts" and "authorities." When asked to
explain his rejection of such apparent wisdom he simply said:
...When I make wheels
If I go easy, they fall apart,
If I am too rough, they do not fit.
If I am neither too easy nor too violent
They come out just right. The work is what
I want it to be.
You cannot put this into words:
You just have to know how it is .... 114

discretion. Standards are more appropriate where one knows less about a problem.
Conversely, where one knows more about a problem, finer rules with more precision
may be established. But precision is not a free commodity. Rule-bounded systems
tend to lose their fuzziness and their common-sense meaning. The systems may also
become unwieldy and difficult to apply. Like any mathematical model, fuzzy logic
falls victim to the "curse of dimensionality." The number of fuzzy rules grows
exponentially. They become more precise but less useful. At some point, a fuzzy
system must contend with a trade-off between numerous rules and standards. Large
rule patches, that is, standards, make a system more manageable but also less precise.
[footnotes omitted]
1 See KOSKO, supra note 5, at 262-63.
113See MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 5, at 211-21; see also FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS, supra
note 10, at 7.
'" CHUANG TZU (trans. Merton), supra note 21, at 83.
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